04Sheet 04.05 · Hazards

Layer D: State changes no operation explains

Every hazard in layer D of the registry, each with its evidence and the test the corpus holds or will hold for it.

Ledger entries created, updated or removed by something other than an operation that names them: trustlines from contract calls, eviction, restores, revocation.

H-D1in the corpusreplay probe
Contract call creates a classic trustline (no CHANGE_TRUST, no event)
TestS5 (source auth), S6 (address auth), S7 (no-op on existing), P28 variants
H-D2in the corpusreplay probe
XLM SAC transfer creates an account
EvidenceCAP-0073
TestS10
H-D3in the corpusreplay probe
Pre-auth signer disappears; sponsorship moves between accounts
Evidence
TestC35, C23, C44
H-D4in the corpusreplay probe
TTL extend and restore change entries with no value change
Evidencestellar-etl#461 (misnamed restored-key hash)
TestS29, S30, mainnet extend/restore; archived → restored (LEDGER_ENTRY_RESTORED): s-base archival-restore-footprint, archival-automatic-restore-in-invoke
H-D5in the corpusreplay probe
Contract wasm upgrade, contract creation (constructor args, salt)
Evidencestellar-etl#462 (salt omitted)
TestS12–S18, mainnet M:soroban-wasm-upgrade
H-D6in the corpusreplay probe
Entries removed by no transaction: eviction (evicted_keys), hot archive
EvidenceCAP-0062; stellar-etl#461
TestGenerated: after a config upgrade to the minimum lifetimes and an eviction scan from level 1, ledgers with no transactions carry evicted_keys: three persistent entries archived to the hot archive 10 ledgers after creation, temporary entries deleted (including older ones the scan reached): s-base archival-empty-ledgers; mined: pubnet 65460631 evicts 1000 contract-data entries and their 1000 TTL keys in a ledger with 162 transactions: exactly maxEntriesToArchive, which counts entries, not keys (BucketManager.cpp:1243-1268), and was 1000 on mainnet from pubnet 59516381 (mined/queries/q17_state_archival_setting.sql; at pubnet 59313516 it was briefly 0, pausing eviction)
H-D7in the corpusreplay probe
Automatic restore inside InvokeHostFunction (archivedSorobanEntries, SorobanTransactionDataExt.1) vs RestoreFootprint
EvidenceCAP-0066
TestOne ledger, two restores of evicted persistent entries: an InvokeHostFunction whose SorobanTransactionDataExt v1 marks readWrite[0] archived, giving restored then updated changes for the same key in one operation (CAP-0066), and a RestoreFootprint giving restored changes only: s-base archival-automatic-restore-in-invoke, archival-restore-footprint
H-D8in the corpusconformanceverify facts
TTL entries name data only by sha256(LedgerKey)
TestFact on S29: key_hash = sha256(LedgerKey(...)); conformance op ledger_key_hash
H-D9in the corpusreplay probe
Revoking authorization removes offers and turns pool shares into new claimable balances (no create op)
TestThe issuer fully deauthorizes mm's XPF trustline: three offers removed, two claimable balances created from redeemed pool shares (no create op), pool-share trustline removed, and the liquidity pool entry itself removed because mm was its last shareholder: c-base revoke-trustline-with-offers-and-pool-shares
H-D10in the corpusreplay probe
Contract-data identity is (contract, key, durability); instance storage; a non-SAC ["Balance", G] key
TestOne contract, one key, two durabilities: (CA1, "dup", persistent) and (CA1, "dup", temporary), plus the same key in instance storage: s-base kit2-same-key-three-durabilities; a non-SAC contract storing a SAC-shaped ["Balance", bob] key: kit-put-sac-shaped-balance-key
H-D11in the corpusconformancereplay probe
External-ref executables (CAP-0085): CONTRACT_EXECUTABLE_EXTERNAL_REF, SCV_EXECUTABLE_TAG
Evidencecap-index.md:123; stellar-etl#470
TestExecutable-reference entry keyed by SCV_EXECUTABLE_TAG "kit" in CA1: s-base kit2-set-executable-ref; CreateContractV2 with CONTRACT_EXECUTABLE_EXTERNAL_REF: deploy-external-ref-executable; that contract running the referenced Wasm: invoke-external-ref-contract
H-D12in the corpusreplay probeverify facts
Frozen keys (CAP-0077): txFROZEN_KEY_ACCESSED, *_TRUSTLINE_FROZEN, offers removed
Evidencewallet-backend#754 halt; cap-index.md:114
TestCAP-0077 apply-time paths after freezing three trustlines: CLAIM_CLAIMABLE_BALANCE_TRUSTLINE_FROZEN, LIQUIDITY_POOL_DEPOSIT_TRUSTLINE_FROZEN, LIQUIDITY_POOL_WITHDRAW_TRUSTLINE_FROZEN, and a path payment that removes an offer whose seller trustline is frozen (nothing moved; the frozen trustline is still updated to release liabilities): s-base frozen-*. txFROZEN_KEY_ACCESSED is unreachable in a closed ledger: the check (TransactionFrame.cpp:1485) uses the same last-closed-ledger config at validation and apply, and queued transactions are re-validated after every close. Mined: pubnet 65273932, a mainnet config upgrade that freezes a fourth account

The hazards come straight from caps/registry.json. A tag says which check will exercise each one: replay probe, conformance, linter, guide or verify facts. In the corpus means an entry already targets it.